University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
College of Business Faculty Publications

Business, College of

May 1991

Class Conflict, Corporate Power, and Macroeconomic Policy: The
Impact of Inflation in the Postwar Period
Ann Mari May
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, amay1@UNL.edu

Randy R. Grant
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub
Part of the Business Commons

May, Ann Mari and Grant, Randy R., "Class Conflict, Corporate Power, and Macroeconomic Policy: The
Impact of Inflation in the Postwar Period" (1991). College of Business Faculty Publications. 22.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub/22

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Business Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in Journal of Economic Issues 25:2 (June 1991), pp. 373–381.
Copyright © 1991 Association for Evolutionary Economics. Used by permission.

~ei

JOURNAL OF ECONOMlC ISSUES
Val. XXV No. 2 June 1991

Class Conflict, Corporate Power,
and Macroeconomic Policy: The Impact of
Inflation in the Postwar Period
Ann Mari May
and
Randy R. Grant

When Richard Nixon ran for the presidency in 1968, he declared that
inflation was America's number one problem. While opinion polls
showed otherwise, an undaunted Nixon set about to reduce inflation
and to convince the public of the dangers of rising prices. To help in
this effort, the Council of Economic Advisors initiated a study to identify those impacted adversely by inflation. The study, however, was disappointing. According to Herbert Stein, "If anyone was being severely
hurt, the available statistics were too crude to reveal it."'
Nixon was not the first, nor was he the last president to warn of the
hazards of inflation. Virtually every postwar president since Dwight Eisenhower has warned of the ravages of inflation and perpetuated the,
by now, unquestioned belief that inflation exacts a tremendous toll on
the standard of living of most, if not all Americans. This belief has in
turn allowed policymakers to enact contractionary policies that often
impose tremendous human costs on those least able to sustain them in
an effort to reduce inflation.
The authors are Assistant Professor and graduate student, respectively, in the Departmcnt ofEconornics, Lrni~-ersitv
of Nebraska-Lincoln. This article was presented at the anntral rnectings cf the .4ssociation .for Evolutionary Economics, 28 December 1990,
U'ashington. D. C.
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While the costs of unemployment are highly visible and identifiable,
impacting lower income groups much more significantly than upper income groups, the costs of moderate inflation are more ambiguous.*
Like unemployment, the costs of inflation are not shared equally
throughout society. However, unlike unemployment, moderate inflation appears to disadvantage the rich and benefit, or at least not hurt,
a large proportion of the population.
This article examines inflation in the postwar period and offers an
explanation for the aversion to inflation that fits within a radical institutionalist framework.3 We suggest that the concern over inflation reflects the interests of corporate welfare over the interests of community
welfare. Moreover, anti-inflation efforts have accommodated corporate
consolidation and hegemony.
Reexamining the Costs of Zqilation

When the Full Employment Bill was initially proposed in 1945, public support for federal government intervention to maintain full employment was substantial. The Great Depression made the need for
government action on the federal level appear obvious, while the success of the war economy of World War I1 made planning appear possible. However, opposition to the Full Employment Bill quickly
mobilized. Not surprisingly, the National Association of Manufacturers and other business organizations argued that the bill would undermine business confidence and lead to inflati~n.~
That government intervention to maintain full employment would
undermine business confidence was not an unexpected argument. But
the argument that government efforts to maintain full employment
would lead to inflation is unique to the postwar period and resulted in
the inclusion of price stability as a policy goal in the Employment Act
of 1946.
The inclusion of price stability as a policy goal in the Employment
Act of 1946 laid the foundation for the postwar debate over macroeconomic policy. Implicit in the policy debate was the assumption that
while unemployment impacts different groups differently, inflation
hurts all or most Americans. Empirical studies analyzing the costs of
inflation, however, do not confirm this assumption.
In a study examining the distribution of money income by quintiles,
Alan S. Blinder and Howard Esaki find that inflation has not significantly influenced the size distribution of family income. Their findings
indicate that no income groups suffered a significant decline in money
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income from inflation.' Moreover, Robinson Hollister and John
Palmer, who examine expenditures, rkal income, and wealth effects
from inflation on the poor and non-poor, find that the relative position
of the poor may actually have improved with inflation from 1947 to
1967.qn a similar analysis examining expenditures of the poor from
1967 to 1981, Douglas A. Hibbs Jr. concludes that inflation "may actually have improved somewhat the relative real income position of
low-income household^."^
Finally, Joseph Minarik simulates the effect of moderate inflation on
a broader measure of household income called "accrued comprehensive income," which includes consumption plus the change in net
worth. Minarik's results show no income loss for low-income households, while middle-income households are unaffected for the most
part. In contrast, upper-income households lose substantially from in-.
flation. According to Minarik, "greater real income taxes, lagging corporate retained earnings, and especially the depreciation of the face
value of dollar-denominated interest-bearing securities combine to
make upper income households the big losers from inflati~n."~
The results of these empirical studies would seem to indicate that
moderate inflation adversely impacts only upper-income households
and may even result in a decrease in income inequality. But what about
the corporate sector and corporate income?
Douglas Hibbs examines both pre-tax and after-tax profit shares
rates of return from 1950 to 1981. Hibbs finds that while "inflation

bears essentially no connection to either the pretax profit share or the
pretax rate of return in the private corporate sector," inflation does ad.~
versely impact after-tax profits and the after-tax rate of r e t ~ r nDepreciation allowances and inventory valuation methods explain this
decline in after-tax corporate profits. According to Hibbs, corporate tax
law, until 1981, stipulated that depreciation allowances be based upon
capital assets valued at historical cost. With inflation, the value of the
depreciation allowance is eroded. Additionally, inventory valuation
methods such as first in/first out (FIFO)overstate corporate profits and
increase corporate taxes by evaluating costs at the oldest levels.
Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that a majority of
households do not suffer real income loss as a result of moderate inflation. Far from being a widespread problem affecting all or most Americans, inflation appears to adversely impact only upper-income
households, in addition to eroding away after-tax profits. If moderate
inflation has such a benign impact, how do we explain the persistent
aversion to inflation?
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One possible explanation, offered by Edward Foster, suggests that the
public "misunderstands" inflation and attributes declines in real income from other sources, to the effects of inflation.I0 A second explanation offered by Foster is that inflation erodes confidence in
government and its ability to solve problems in a just and equitable
manner." This argument is, of course, a variant of the one proposed
by John Maynard Keynes and more recently by James K. Galbraith.lz
These arguments, while plausible, do not offer a very satisfiing explanation. Keynes and Galbraith's observations would seem to apply
more to European countries with historical experience with hyperinflation. Moreover, merely to assume that a majority of the public
might believe that their interests are being served by reducing inflation
really begs the question.
We suggest that the concern for inflation reflects the imperatives of
a corporate capitalist culture and that the consolidation of business creates both inflationary pressure and the imperative to hold those inflationary pressures in check. Moreover, anti-inflation efforts have
accommodated corporate consolidation and extended corporate hegemony. Why do Americans believe that even moderate inflation is
harmful? Because, as Paul Peretz has argued, they have been told that
it is harmful by policymakers, economists, and business leaders who
largely reflect the interests of the corporate sector."
A Radical Institutionalist Perspective

While it is perhaps true that the Marxists have contributed most to
our understanding of the relationship between the state and the corporation, institutionalists have become increasingly interested in examining the various aspects of corporate hegemony.14 While Gardiner
Means and others describe how corporate consolidation contributes to
inflation, insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which macroeconomic policy goals and stabilization policy in the postwar period
have reflected the imperatives of a corporate culture.
While empirical studies such as those of Hibbs indicate that inflation
has tended to erode away after-tax profits, the factors identified as being
most responsible for this decline in profits have changed significantly
since 1981. Tax laws concerning depreciation allowances have been
changed to allow valuation of capital assets at current levels and many
firms have now switched to inventory valuation methods based upon
last in/first out (LIFO), thus decreasing corporate tax 1iability.Is Yet,
corporate aversion to inflation appears unaltered.
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John Kenneth Galbraith, in The New Industrial State, offers an alternative explanation for the corporate aversion to inflation. In his
view, inflation interferes with the planning sector, which requires stability in costs and prices for effective planning. As Galbraith sees it,
"Inflationary price and cost increases, moving unpredictably through
the system . . . introduce an unwelcome element of randomness and error."ln The uncertainty associated with inflation undermines the corporation's ability to safely engage in long-term contracts. While the
planning sector may have market power to pass along cost increases,
changes in prices may also make the management of demand more
difficult by making consumers more sensitive to changes in prices.
While the goal of reducing inflation appears to reflect the interest of
the corporate sector, government policies to reduce inflation have,
moreover, accommodated the corporate sector and expanded corporate hegemony by increasing unemployment, weakening labor, and accelerating consolidation and concentration. Throughout the postwar
period, policy-makers have consistently fought inflation through contractionary aggregate demand policies and consistently denied that it
would increase unemployment. From Richard Nixon's "gradualism"
to Ronald Reagan's "supply-side" machinations, we have been promiseda painless solution to inflation and given a good dose ofunemployment and recession. In what ways have these induced recessions
advanced the interests of the corporate sector? Given that corporate
profits are highly pro-cyclical. isn't it in the interest of the corporate

sector to guarantee sustained expansion?
This is not, of course, a new question. Michal Kalecki, in 1943, addressed this question and argued that capitalist systems will continue
to experience periodic unemployment, not because governments would
be technically incapable of maintaining full employment, but because
the government would intentionally create recession and unemployment. Kalecki shared Marx's view that the state is an arm ofthe capitalist class and argued that politicians would respond to pressure from
groups averse to maintaining full employment, those who require periodic unemployment or the threat of unemployment to "discipline in
the factories."" Therefore, while periodic unemployment and recession
reduce corporate profits, they also provide a valuable means of controlling labor. However, our increasing reliance on monetary policy as a
means of fighting inflation also serves the interest of the corporate sector.
Reflecting upon The New Industrial State, Galbraith suggests that the
planning system's control over the state has gone beyond what Gal-
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braith had himself envisioned some twenty years earlier. Moreover,
Galbraith did not anticipate the "escape into monetarism" with its high
real interest rates and the degree to which monetary policy would accommodate the needs of the planning sector. "Like others," Galbraith
remarked, "while doubting the efficacy of monetary policy, I assumed
it to be socially and politically neutral. It assuredly is not."18
Monetary policy has increasingly been the preferred, although not
sole, policy tool for fighting inflation. When inflation began to increase
in the mid-1960s, it was contractionary monetary policy that was first
to respond. The result was the 1966 credit crunch. In 1973 when the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled
the price of oil, it was the Federal Reserve's offsetting response of contractionary policies that helped propel the economy into the worst recession, at that time, since the Great Depression. Again in 1980,
monetary policy turned wildly contractionary in response to another
supply-side shock. Moreover, the 1981-1 982 recession, now the worst
since the Great Depression, was also largely the result of severely contractionary monetary policy.
Many reasons account for the use of contractionary monetary policy
to fight inflation. The growth of entitlement programs, defense spending, and the increase in the interest component of government outlays
have made a large portion of the budget untouchable. These hctors,
along with the reluctance of politicians to raise taxes, may also account
for the use of monetary policy. But there are other compelling factors
that suggest why monetary policy has been the weapon of choice in
fighting inflation.
As Galbraith has suggested, contractionary monetary policy results
in high real interest rates, which have been attractive to upper income
individuals and large corporations. Because nonhancial corporations
are less dependent upon external sources to finance capital expenditures, they, along with individuals with money to lend, benefit from
high real interest rates.19 Both wealthy individuals and corporations
benefit from high real interest rates on financial assets without suffering
losses from borrowing in credit markets. Perhaps more important,
however, is the impact of high real 'interest rates on corporate concentration and power.
In their study of credit markets, E. W. Davis and K. A. Yeomans
assert that restrictive monetary policy allows larger companies to put
a "credit squeeze" on their smaller competitors. Examining liquidity
and net trade credit given during the "ease" and "squeeze" periods, Davis and Yeomans conclude that small companies suffer liquidity dete-
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rioration and increase their bank borrowing during the squeeze years.
Because small firms lack the corporation's ability to finance internally,
they are far more vulnerable to problems of insufficient credit. The primary significance of the squeeze on small companies is that the weakened position of smaller firms increases the likelihood of concentration
in that industry.20
Increasing concentration does more than enhance corporate power;
it also tends to increase income inequality. In an empirical study analyzing the relationship between concentration and income distribution, Irene Powell finds that a reduction in concentration results in
a decrease in income inequality.21 When concentration decreases, excess profits decline, resulting in falling prices for consumers. Powell argues that these falling prices benefit lower-income households while
reducing income to upper-income households. She concludes that a reduction in concentration is associated with a decrease in income inequality. Although Powell's study examines the impact of decreases in
concentration on income inequality, the opposite case can easily be
made that increases in industry concentration would result in an increase in income inequality.
The use of contractionary monetary policy increases income inequality indirectly through its impact on industry concentration and
directly through high interest rates in general. Since the majority of
interest-bearing assets are held by wealthier individuals, increases in
real interest rates will raise their relative income. In part because of

higher real interest rates, the interest component of national income
has risen to around ten percent.z2
ConcludingRemarks

In Radical Institutionalism: Contemporary Voices, James Dietz critically evaluates the contribution that radical institutionalists might
make to our understanding of political economy. Dietz argues that a
useful avenue for exploration concerns the role of the state in a culture
of corporate capitalism. Moreover, examination of the role of the state
will most likely entail a class rather than class-less interpretation, where
"changes that truly benefit classes other than the ruling class" are possible while the "thrust of the state's efforts must, and will, be directed
toward providing an environment in which the capitalist productive
apparatus is effectively reproduced."23
Because evidence suggests that inflation hurts upper-income households and the corporate sector while, if not benefiting, at least not hurt-
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ing a majority of the population, the aversion to inflation and the policy
induced contractionsto fight inflation are best viewed within the framework of class. As Harry G. Johnson has said, "From one important
point of view, indeed, the avoidance of inflation and the maintenance
of full employment can be most usefully regarded as conflicting class
interests.""
The tension generated by the class struggle over the inflationunemployment trade-off has been mediated, in part, by the state. The
state, as Marx and Veblen believed, has often, although not always, accommodated the interests of the corporate class where the corporate
class is not merely profit-maximizing, but seeks power as well as profits.
In addition, the state often attempts to mold public opinion to conform
to the interests of the corporate class.
The state's role in shaping public opinion on the costs of inflation
represents an example of what William Dugger has referred to as an
"enabling myth."Zs The belief that inflation is detrimental to everyone
not only allows politicians to pursue anti-inflationary policies that benefit the interests of the corporate class, but compels them to do so. In
so doing, the inflation myth perpetuates economic and social policies
that enhance the power and status of corporations, exacerbate income
inequality, and undermine participatory democracy.
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